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EARNINGS QUALITY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN IPO FIRMS 
Mary F. Calegari, San Jose State University 
. Maretno A. Harjoto , Pepperdine University 
We determine earn ings quality by examining the stability of earnings and its components (accruals 
and cash flows) using transition matrices. We find the accrual component exhibited grea ter 
instability compared to earnings and cash flows, suggesting earnings consisting primarily . of 
accruals are of lower quality than earnings comprised primarily of cash flows. Using an ordered 
l og it model, we find !PO firms are more likely to be in the top quartile of earnings and cash flows 
when they are older, larger, and have stronger corporate governance. Fi rms are more likely to 
report greater accruals when they are smaller and have weaker governance. 
Introduction 
Following the corporate scandals of 2002 and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 
changes that affected the corporate governance structure of firms were made to improve the quality 
of finan cial reporting. The advent of SOX provides evidence that corporate governance is viewed 
as an important factor that influences the firm's financial reporting process. Internal corporate 
governance me~hanisms are established to maintain the credibility of the firm' s financial statements 
and safeguard against behavior s uch as earnings management. 
The initial public offering (IPO) process is particularly susceptible to earnings reporting options, 
offering entrepreneurs both motivation and opportunity to manage earnings. fi>O firms have an 
incenti ve to window-dress their earnings in order to procure high stock prices. Also, at the time of 
the fi>O, there is little publicly available information about these firm s other than that contained in 
their pro spectuses . Therefore, in evaluating an fi>O firm's future prospects, investors must rely 
heavily on the integrity of the firm's finan cial reporting process and the disclosures made in its 
financial · s tatements. These co nditions provide IPO firms with the opportunity to choose the 
compositio n of their reported earnings. 
IPO firms have the ability to determine the makeup of their reported earnings since earnings 
consists of two components: accrual . and cash flow components. The. earnings management 
literature indi cates that firms can manipulate reported earnings through the accrual c omponent by 
reporting aggressively higher short-term earnings that' cannot be sustained in the future . Firm s can 
report earnings in excess of cash flows by taking positive accruals . However, high earnings due to 
large posi tive accruals will not persist into the future and, therefore, lower the quality of the firm's 
financial reports [Sloan 1996]. Also, a low quality firm has a natural tendency to overs tate e arnings 
so that it can be pooled with high quality firms [Fan 2007). 
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The development of good corporate governance should result in quality earnings reporti ng. 
This is corroborated by Denise Nappier of Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds: 
"Sustainable corporate governance yields sustainable rates of returns." Johnna Torsone, ~n 
executive at Pitney Bowes, shares the same sentiment: "Sustained good governance has resul ted in 
sustained good performance for us [Fishman-Lapin 2005]." 
I 
The purpose of this study is to examine the quality of earnings and corporate governance in IPO 
firms . First, we develop transition matrices to determine earnings quality by analyzing the stability 
of earnings and its accrual and cash flow components over the two years subsequent to the IPO. We 
find that IPO firms with earnings that are primarily attributable to the accrual component have low 
quality earnings since the accrual component is not sustainable into the future. In contrast, we find 
that IPO firms with earnings that are primarily attributable to the cash flow component have high 
quality earnings since the large cash flow component (both positive and negative) is sustainable into 
the future. When we examine total earnings, we discover that the firms in the top and bottom 
earnings quartiles have higher quality earnings compared to firms in the middle quartiles, due to the 
large cash flow component. 
Second, we use ordered logit models to examine the effect of corporate governance factors on 
! the likelihood that IPO firms will be in the top, middle, or bottom quartiles of earnings, accruals, or cash flows at the li>O and the Subsequent two years. 
!I We fmd that TI>O firms are more likely to be in the top quartile of earnings and cash flows whenll 	 they are older, larger and have stronger corporate governance. Also, firms with high cash flows do 
!I 	 not need to conduct a seasoned equity offering to obtain more capital. On the other hand, JPO firms 
are more likely to be in the top accrual quartile when they are smaller and have weaker corporate 
governance. These firms also ·conduct seasoned equity offerings in order to obtain additional 
funding. 
Our study offers three major contributions to the existing research. First, our paper extends the 
current literature by analyzing earnings, and its accrual and cash flow components of JPO firms . 
This differs from prior studies on IPO firms since they focus qnly on the accrual component of 
earnings and its relation to subsequent stock return performance [Teoh et al. 1998, DuCharme et al. 
2001 , Kimbro 2005, Fan 2007). Second, to examine the quality- of earnings, we create transition 
matrices that document the migration of the firms across the different quartile rankings for earnings, 
accruals and cash flows in the first and second year after the JPO. This behavior has not been 
documented in prior studies. Lastly, our findings support the adoption of SOX to improve corporate 
governance, which in tum will promote the quality of reported earnings. 
Literature Review 
:I 	
I Earnings, Accruals and Cash Flows 
! The concept of "earnings quality" embodies the degree to which reported earnings reflect theI 
true operational health of a business. Prior research shows that firms with persistent earnings are!I 
assigned a greater value in their securities [Kormendi andLipe 1987, Collins and Kothari 1989, Ali 
and Zarowin 1992). Therefore, earnings persistence should reflect a higher quality of earnings,I 
:! 
l 
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[Calegari and Harjoto 2005]. Prior studies use statistically motivated models in determining their 
meas ure of earnings persistence. Sloan [1996], on the other hand, uses a model that relies on the 
characteristics of the underlying accounting process. He dec omposes earnings into its accrual and 
cash flow co mpone nts. 
Financial statement analysis textbooks emphasize the importance of analyzing the accrual and 
cash flow components of current earnings in assessi ng the persistence of future earnings . Cash flow 
from operations is less susceptible to distortion than net income. The accrual-based net income 
number relies on accruals, deferral s, allocations and valuations, which all involve a higher degree of 
subjectivity than what enters into the determinati on of cash flow from operations [Bernstein 1993] . 
Although bo th components contribute to current earnings, high pe.rformance that is attributable to 
the cash flow component of earnings is more likely to persist than high perform ance that is 
attributable to the accrual component [Sloan 1996]. 
Earnings Management in IPO Firms 
Fi nancial accounting inform ation plays a significant role in investors ' decisions to purchase a 
company 's stocks or bonds, thereb y giving managers or initial owners strong incentives to present 
favorable earnings reports. Kellogg and Kellogg [ 1991 ) indi cate that two driving force s for fraud , 
mi srepresentation, and manipulation in fin ancial statements are: (1) to encourage investors to buy 
an interes t in a company 's stock as owners, or in bonds as creditors; and (2) to increase the value of 
the stock of existing shareholders of the co mpany. The National Association of Certified Fraud 
E xaminers [ 1993) also states that a major reason for financial statement manipulation is "to 
encourage investment through the sale o f stock" by incumbent shareholders . This evidence 
suggests that IPO firm s have a stron g motivation to manipulate earnings . 
IPOs tend to be made by relatively young firms with limited operating histories . Generall y, 
there is little publicly available info rmation about these firms other than that contained in their 
prospectuses at the time of the IPO . Therefore, in evaluating an IPO firm 's future prospects , 
investors must rely on the finn ' s disclosures made in the financial statements. This creates an 
informational asymmetry between the entrepreneur taking his firm public and potential investors . 
The asyrrunetric information provides IPO firm s with the opportunity to manage earnings . 
Teoh et al. [1998] examine the relation between the long-run pos t-IPO return underperformance 
and IPO firms' earnings management. They find that IPO firms with higher discretionary accruals 
hav e poorer stock return performance in the s ubseque nt three years . Similarly, Fan [2007) find s 
that discretionary accru als are the highest in the IPO year and have strong predictive power for IPO 
firms' subsequent decline in operating performance. DuCharme et al. [2001) investigates the role 
of earnings management by issuers prior to making IPOs . Similar to earlier studies, the y find that 
abnormal accruals during the offer year are significantly negatively related to subsequent finn stock 
returns. Contrary to this, Kimbro [2005] documents that pre-IPO A-firms in China from 1995 ­
2002 , on average, con sistently used negative di scretionary accruals during all years, in order to 
decrease earnings and reduce the initial price of their IPO . 
The studies mentioned above only examine the relati on between accruals and stock return 
performance. They do not consider the cash flow component of earnin gs, the s ubsequent 
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performance of earnings and its components, or the effect of corporate governance on the financia l 
reportin g process. 
Corporate Governance 
Finns establish internal corporate governan ce processes to preserve the credibili ty of the firms' 
financial reporting process and financial statement di sclosures, as well as to safeguard agains t such ·, 
·. 
behavior as earnings manipulation. The board of directors is a crucial part of the corporate { . 
structure. The board provides the link between the providers of capital (shareholders) and those 
who use that capital to create value (managers). Farna [1980] theorizes that outside directors are 1,; 
essential to creating a board that will fun ction as an effective monitor of management. Empirical r,
evidence indicates that more independent board structures contribute to better monitoring of ~-
management and lead to better decision-making that follows shareholders ' interests [Hochberg 
2003 , Reitenga and Tearney 2003"]. The major committees involved in the governance of the finn t ~-
are the audit and compensation committees. The role of the audit committee includes preventing 1 .. 
fraudulent accounting statements , as well as mediating disputes between management and outside 
auditors regarding the application of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. T he compensation 
committee determines and rev iews compensation packages for top management based on their 
efforts to increase the firm's value [Hochberg 2003]. 
The ownership structure of the firm may also influence top management's financial reporting 
decisions. Since external blockholders have large sharehold ings, they could become effective 
monitors, reducing the likelihood of earnings management [Reitenga and Tearney 2003]. Warfield 
et al. [1995] find that managerial ownership is positively related to the informativeness of 
accou nting earnings. They also find ·that the magnitude of discretionary acco untin g accrual 
adjustments is significantly higher when managerial ownership is low. Similarly , Fan [2007] finds 
evidence that riskier IPO firms ·resort to income-increasing earnings management and retain less 
ownership . This evidence s uggests that managerial ownership mitigates earni ngs manipulation 
through accruals and increases earnings quality. 
J • 
( 
(.' 
Various CEO characteristics provide CEOs with the incenti ve and opportunity to manage 
earnings to their advantage. CEO tenure and whether the CEO is the fou nder of the company r· 
measures the relative power of the CEO. When the chairman of the board is the CEO, management ~ ; . 
is accountable to a body led by manageme nt. The CEO is then put in the position of evaluating his 
or her own performance, creating a clear conflict of interest. 
Contribution of the Study 
Our study contributes to the existing research in several ways. First, our paper extends the 

current liter ature by examining the quality of financial reporting of earnings and the accrual and 
 ~ . 
cash flow components of earnings by IPO firms . By partitioning earnings into its accrual and cash ~ -: ,. flow components, we can determjne which component is more susceptible to earnings management 

and influenced by corporate governance factors. This differs from prior studies on earnings 
 , 
, •., 
management in IPO firm s since they focus on ly on the accrual component of earnings and its 

relation to subsequent stock return performance [Teoh et a\. 1998, DuCharme et al. 2001, Kimbro 
 '·­
.2005 ,·Fan 2007). 
·,I 	t: 
i)'· 
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Second, we analyze the quality of earnings by examining the stability of earnings and its 
components for JPO firm s that are ranked into quartile portfolios based on earnings, accrual s, or 
cash flows. We create transition matrices that document the migration of the firms across the 
different quartile rankin gs for earni ngs, accruals, and cash flows, in the first and second year after 
the IPO. Higher stability of earnings reflects higher credibjlity of reported earnings. We investigate 
which quartile of firms is more likely to change its reported earnings and components of earnings . 
Thi s behavior has no t been documented in prior studies. 
Lastly, we use an ordered logit regression to inv estigate the influence of corporate governance 
on the likelihood that IPO firms wi ll be in the first, second, third , or fourth quartil es of earn ings, 
accruals, or cash flows in the IPO year and two subsequent years . 
Sample, Data, and Variables 
We utilize ·the sample of firm s that went public during the peak peri od of IPOs (1996-1997). 
Thi s peak period of IPOs provides a unique market environment and timeframe to exam ine the 
impact of corporate go vernance on the firms' financi al reporting proce ss prior to the burst of the 
s tock market bubble and prior to SOX. We analyze the firms' reported earnings, and its accru al and 
cash flo w components, for the IPO year and two subsequent years. We require that these firms 
survi ve at least two consecutive years after its IPO year since we are interes ted in the behavior of 
earnings and its co mponents after the IP0. 1 
We manually collected the corporate governance data from the Security Exch ange C ommission 
(SEC) Edgar Web site. We ob tained the earnings, earnings components and other financ ial 
information from Compustat. We then matched our sample of firms from the SEC Edgar Web site 
with the fin ancial information from the Compustat database . Our sample is restricted to the 
availability of corporate governance data and fin ancial information for the IPO year and two 
co nsecutive years after the 1PO. Our final sample consists of 107 firms. 
The financial variables of in tere st in thi s study are earnings, accruals, and cash from operati ons. 
"E arnings" is defined as operating income after depreciation. We select this definition because it 
excludes non-recurrin g items. The accrual component of earnin gs is computed using information 
from the balance sheet and in come s tatement, whi ch is common in the earnings management 
literature .[Dechow et al. 1995; Sloan 1996]. 
Accruals =(.6CA- .6Cash)- (.6CL- .6STD - .6TP) - Dep 
where .6CA = change in current assets, .6Cash = change in cash/equivalents, .6CL = change in 
current liabili ties, .6STD =change in debt included in current liab ilities, .6TP = change in income 
taxes payable, and Dep = depreciation and amortization expense. Debt in curren t li abilities is 
excluded from accruals because it relates to finan cing transac tions as opposed to operating 
transactions . Income taxes payable is also excluded from accruals for consistency wi th the 
definition of earni ngs employed in the empiri cal tests. The cash fl ow compone nt of earnin gs is 
computed as the difference between earnings and the accrual component of earnings . Thi s 
methodology is similar to that used by Sloan [ 1996] . 
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The empirical tests require cross-sectional and temporal comparisons of the magnitude of 
earnings performance and the relative magnitude of the accrual and cash flow components of 
earnings. Therefore, we standardize all three financial variables by firm size to facilitate the 
comparisons. We use total assets as our proxy for firm size, measured as the average of the 
beginning and end of year book value of total assets. The three financial variables we use in the 
empirical tests are defined as follows: 
Earnings 
Accrual Component 
Cash Flow 
Component 
= __In_c_o_m_e_fr_o_m_C_o_n_t_in_u_i_n-'='g'--O_p.._e_r_a_ti_o_n_s__ 
Average Total Assets 
= Accruals 
Average Total Assets 
= Income from Continuing Operations ­
Accruals 
Average Total Assets 
The corporate governance variables we use in this study are as follows: (1) For board structure 
we use board size (BODSIZE), percentage of outside directors (ODPCTBOD), size of audit 
committee (AUDCOM), and size of compensation committee (COMPCOM); (2) for ownership 
concentration we use percentage of external blockholder ownership (EXTBLOCK) and percentage 
of total CEO ownership, including restricted stock grants (TOTCEOWN); and (3) for CEO 
characteristics we use a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is the chairman of the board and 
zero otherwise (CEOCHAIR), a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is the founder of the 
finn and zero otherwise (CEOFOUND), and CEO tenure (CEOTENUR). 
We also control for the age of the company (YRFOUND), finn size (measured by the natural 
log of total assets) (LOGASSET), and whether the finn conducts a primary seasoned equity offering 
(SEO). Older firms tend to be more established and exhibit stronger and more stable earnings 
performance. Larger firms benefit from economies of scale and thus become more efficient and 
profitable. SEO is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm conducts a seasoned 
equity offering since firms may manage earnings upwards prior to an SEO. 
'! We include a time trend variable (TREND) in our analysis. Since we are interested in 
investigating the behavior of earnings (and its accrual and cash flow components) over the two 
years subsequent to the IPO, this time trend variable captures any changes over time in earnings and 
its components. Lastly, to control for any industry effects, we include dummy variables that equal 
one if the firm belongs to one of the two-digit SIC codes 10 through 87 and zero otherwise (SICI0­
87). 
Methodology 
This study examines IPO firms during three different time periods: IPO date, one year after, and 
two years after the IPO. In each period, we classify the firms in our sample into four different 
quartiles based oil earnings and the components of earnings (accruals and cash flows). We rank 
~ ,' . ·' 
i 
I 
~-
f • 
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earnings , accruals, and cash flows from the lowest quartile (Ql) to the highest quartile (Q4). To 
investigate the persistence of earnings, accruals, and cash flows from year to year, we use a 
transition (migration) matrix . The transition matrix is commonly used to examine the stability of 
borrowers' credit ratings in public debt [Nickell, Perraudin, Varotto 2000]. We construct the 
.. 
' ·' 
transition matrix to document the migration of firms' earnings, accruals, and cash flows across the 
. 
. 
'
( different quartiles during the two-year period after the IPO. The transition matrix shows the 
' , I 
! 7 percentage of firms that remain in the same quartile and the percentage of firms that move to 
• , 	 :. different (terminal) quartiles. during the first and second year after the IPO. The larger per~entage 
.. 
of firms that stay within the same quartile indicates a higher stability of earnings, accruals, or cash 
. , flows during the first and second year after the IPO. 
.. 
i 	 l 
. 	 ·: 
We continue our analysis of firms' earnings reporting and corporate governance by examining 
the impact of governance structure on the li kelihood of firms' earnings and components of earnings 
. \ to move up, stay, or move down across the four different quartiles. Using the ordered logit 
. .. 
'· 	 i~ 
regression model , we want to examine the impact of corporate governance on the likelihood of IPO 
firms to be in the first, second, third, and fourth quartiles of earnings, accruals, or cash flows during 
the two years after the IPO. The dependent variable is a discreet variable that takes the value of 1 
(bottom quartile, Ql), 2 (second quartile from the bottom, Q2), 3 (second quartile from the top, Q3), 
and 4 (top quartile, Q4) to represent the four quartiles. The ordered logit is suitable to express the 
order (ranking) of the bottom, second bottom, second top, and top quartiles. The ordered logit 
model allows us to investigate the impact of the firms' corporate governance structure on the 
·! 
' t likelihood of firms to move from the bottom to the top quartiles or vice versa. The ordered logit 
i model can be defined as: 
: 
Probability (Y1 = j I x) = Probability (Y1 = j I x1, x2, x3 , ... , Xk) 
I 
:I where: Probability (Y1 = j I x) represents the conditional probability of firms fall into the jth quartile 
at period t; t =at the IPO, one year after the IPO, and two years after the IPO; j = 1 (bottom quartile,:I Ql), 2 (second bottom quartile, Q2), 3 (second top quartile, Q3), and 4 (top quartile, Q4); Y1 = 1 if':I 
. < Y1 ::; Ql (bottom quartile); Y1 = 2 if Ql < Y1 $ Q2 (second bottom quartile) ; Y1 = 3 if Q2 < Y1 ::; Q3 
-
'·;i (second top quartile); Y1 = 4 if Y1 > Q3 (top quartile); and x1, x2, x3, ... , xk are a set of independent.I 
.i 	 variables of corporate governance, firm characteristics, time trend, and industry effects.· We assume 
.. 
. -~ 
. 
that the probability function follows the logis tic distribution:I 
I 
 
 ! 
i
'
	;
i 
i where: L(x) = Exp(x)/[1 + Exp(x)) is the logistics cumulative distribution for a set of independentI 
:I 
i variables; ~ 1 , ~2 , ~3 , ... , ~k are the es timated slope coefficients for each independent variable. 
The empirical model for the ordered logit regression for IPO firm i is defined as: Probability
i 
(Yit = j I x) = LWo + ~ ~ BODSIZE;t + ~20DPCTBOD;1 + ~3AUDCOM;t + ~4COMPCOM;t + 
I 
I ~5EXTBLOCK; t + ~6TOTCEOWN;1 + ~7CEOCHAIR;1 + ~sCEOFOUND;t + ~9CEOTENUR;, + 
! 
i ~10YRFOUND;t + ~llLOGASSET;t + ~12SEO;c + ~13TREND + ~14-46SIC10- 87 + e;t) 
,, 
We estimate the ordered Jogit regression based on the above empirical model for earnings, accruals, 
.. :·­
. a[ld cash flows separately.
·., ;t 
. :· 
I i 
! 
iI 
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Results 
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Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of our sample of IPO finns ranked on earnings, the 
accrual component of earnings, and the cash flow component of earnings in the IPO year. Panel A 
presents the descriptive statistics for quartiles 1 (lowest) through 4 (highest) ranked on earnings in 
the IPO year. The cash flow component monotonically increases from quartiles 1 through 4 
indicating a positive relation with earnings. Interestingly, the positive earnings in quartiles 3 and 4 
are made up of negative accruals and positive cash flow components. This evidence suggests that 
firms in quartiles 3 and 4 have very strong cash flows to keep earnings positive. The descriptive 
results indicate that earnings for the top two quartiles are primarily attributable to the cash flow 
component and therefore more likely to persist into the future. A comparison of the finns in Ql and 
Q4 indicates that IPO finns that report high positive earnings (Q4) have lower external monitoring, 
more powerful CEOs, and are older and larger compared to IPO firms in the bottom quartile (Ql) 
that report negative earnings. However, a comparison of the Q2 and Q3 firms suggests that the Q3 
firms' earnings, cash flows, and age are significantly higher than the Q2 firms. 
Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the quartile portfolios ranked on the accrual 
component of earnings ·in the !PO year. Earnings monotonically increase from quartile 1 to quartile 
4 indicating a positive relation with accruals. However, the cash flow component is negative for all 
four quartiles and has no association with the accruals. A closer look indicates that earnings is 
positive only in quartile 4 and is composed of positive accruals and negative cash flows. This 
suggests that earnings is primarily attributable to the accrual component and will not be able to 
persist in the future. A comparison of the Ql and Q4 finns indicates that !PO finns that report large 
positive accruals (Q4) have lower external monitoring, longer-tenured CEOs, and are smaller and 
older than firms that report large negative accruals (Q1). The descriptive statistics suggest that the 
firms in the top accrual quartile have weak corporate governance. There are no significant 
differences between the Q2 and Q3 firms. 
Panel C presents the descriptive statistics for quartiles l through 4 ranked on the cash flow 
component of earnings. Earnings monotonically increase from quartile 1 to quartile 4 indicating a 
positive relation between earnings and cash flows. However, the accrual component monotonically 
decreases from quartiles l through 4 suggesting a negative relationship between accruals and cash 
flows. Further examination reveals that the positive earnings in quartiles 3 and 4 consist of negative 
accruals and positive cash flows. This evidence implies that earnings for !PO firms in the third and 
fourth quartiles of cash flows are attributable primarily to the cash flow component. This suggests 
that the positive earnings performance will persist into the future. The comparative results for Q 1 
versus Q4 firms suggest that IPO firms that report large positive cash flows (Q4) are older, larger, 
have higher external monitoring, and higher CEO interest but lower CEO power compared to IPO 
finns that report large negative cash flows (Ql). These results suggest that the firms in the top cash 
flow quartile have good corporate governance. A comparison of the Q2 and Q3 firms indicates that 
the Q3 firms' earnings, cash flows, and size (logasset) are significantly higher than the Q2 firms. 
Figure 1 provides plots of earnings, accruals, and cash flows ranked in quartile portfolios in the 
!PO year. Quartile 1 represents the lowest portfolio and quartile 4 the highest portfolio. As 
indicated in Table l, earnings and cash flows have a very strong positive relationship, as the plots 
are almost identical. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
PaneI A : 1rms R e on Earnmgs m IPO F. a n k d . IPOYear 
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
Q2 vs. Q3 
t-stat 
Ql vs. Q4 
t-stat 
Earnings -0 .1 82 -0. 130 -0.074 0.057 1.2125 2.5097** 
Accrual 
c omponent -0.108 -0.03 1 -0.014 0.089 1.3709 8.2542*** 
Cash flow 
component -0.074 -0.099 -0.059 -0.029 0.8458 0.4591 
BODSIZE 7.443 6.707 6.370 6. 160 1.3966 3.4360*** 
ODPCTBOD 73.604 73.042 72.894 69. 138 0.0736 2.2654** 
AUDCOM 2.709 2.561 2.494 2.605 0.8 158 1.1277 
COMPCOM 2.886 2.561 2.654 2.506 0.9413 3.8285*** 
EXTBLOCK 26 .787 19.729 23.78 19.647 1.4573 2.7335*** 
T OTCEOWN 12.759 10.05 8 17.35 9 15.130 1.1371 1.1072 
CEOCHAIR 0.510 0.5278 0.453 0.406 1.0945 1.5130 
CEOFOUND 0.367 0.293 0 .457 0.457 1.1 830 1.1499 
CEOTENUR 4.051 4.244 5.827 5.35 8 1.1987 1.7998* 
YRFOUND 8.785 8.415 8.395 11.346 0.0233 2.2162** 
L _OGASSET 4.673 4.401 4.399 3.669 0 .0087 3.5477*** 
SEO 0.067 0.102 0.113 0.104 0.2670 0 .94 13 
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
Q2 vs. Q3 
t-stat 
Ql vs. Q4 
t-stat 
Earnings -0.569 -0.040 0.090 0.122 14.944*** 8.8779*** 
Accru al 
component -0.053 -0.036 -0.032 -0.049 1.6161 4.3574*** 
Cash flow 
com_Q_onent -0.51 6 -0.004 0.122 0.171 5.0600*** 7.3488*** 
BODSIZE 6.720 7.039 6.573 6.600 0.3688 0.1407 
ODPCTBOD 76.28 1 72.402 73.255 69.898 0.3786 2.3322** 
AUDCOM 2.627 2.421 2.707 2.653 1.6036 0.48 19 
COMPCOM 2.587 2.724 2.667 2.680 0.0887 0.8443 
EXTBLOCK 27.680 25.755 22. 103 15.295 1.3273 6 .0742*** 
TOTCEOWN 10.773 8.771 12.305 21.088 0.3828 3.8017*** 
CEOCHAIR 0.366 0.3 86 0. 655 0.571 0.7225 2.1965** 
CEO FOUND 0.467 0.303 0.293 0.467 0. 1598 0.6462 
CEOTENUR 4.520 3.816 4.413 7.400 0.9994 3.1 639*** 
YRFO UN D 7.000 6.737 9.733 13.240 1.9773** 6 .5945*** 
LOGASSET 3.703 4.381 4 .689 4.526 1.1943 1.9163* 
SEO 
·' 
'' 
: 
0. 134 0.024 0.143 0. 143 1.3561 0.5194 
: Panel B : IPO F ' urns Rank d e on Aecru a I C omponent of E arrungs m . IPOYear 
; 
., '
ll 
; 
i 
! 
~ 
! 
I 
Journal of Current Research in Global Business Volume 11 Numb er 16 Fall 2008 9.. 
. 
I 
Table 1 (continued) 
.panel C . IPO F'trms Rank d on Cash Fl ow component ofEarnmgs m. IPOYeare 
i 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
. I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
! 
1 
I 
I 

I 

I 
I 
-· Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
Q2 vs. Q3 
t-stat 
Ql vs. Q4 
t-stat 
Earnings -0.483 -0.078 0.066 0.144 4.6993*** 7.1321*** 
Accrual 
component 0.016 -0.005 -0.026 -0.052 1.0919 3.2057*** 
Cash flow 
component -0.504 -0.073 0.092 0.197 7.1116*** 7.9929*** 
BODSIZE 6.259 6.289 6.5125 7.633 0.9709 3.6604*** 
ODPCTBOD 74.217 70.231 71.458 72.801 0.5719 0.7746 
AUDCOM 2.518 2.506 2.625 2.721 1.3427 2.3768** 
COMPCOM 2.457 2.518 2.762 2.873 1.4898 4.2462*** 
EXTBLOCK 26.059 20.437 19.013 24.544 0.5778 0.5163 
TOTCEOWN 8.913 16.311 15.572 14.377 0.2802 3.15 19*** 
CEOCHAIR 0.377 0.472 0.585 0.461 1.6138 1.2347 
CEOFOUND 0.457 0.397 0.437 0.278 0.5138 2.3633** 
CEOTENUR 4.111 5.506 4.650 5.215 1.1212 1.4403 
YRFOUND 7.234 9.060 9.137 11.569 0.0718 4.7706*** 
LOGASSET 3.356 3.997 4.968 4.844 4.5559*** 4.9783*** 
SEO 0.132 0.065 0.085 0.106 0.5565 0.5862 
Note: Ql, Q2, Q3, Q4 represent quartiles from Quartile 1 (the lowest quartile) to Q4 (the highest quartile). Amounts 
represent mean values. Earnings, Accruals and Cash flow components of Earnings are defined in the Sample, Data, and 
Variables section of the text. BODSIZE indicates the number of board members. ODPCTBOD indicates the 
percentage of outside directors in the board (%). AUDCOM indicates the number of audit committee board members, 
while CO.MPCOM indicates the number of compensation committee board members. EXTBLOCK indicates the 
percentage of external (non-insiders and non-board members) blockholders ownership (%). TOTCEOWN is the 
percentage of CEO ownership (%). CEOCHAJR is a dummy variable taking on a value of one if the CEO is the 
chairman of the board and zero otherwise. CEOFOUND is a dummy variable taking on a value of one if the CEO is the 
founder of the firm and zero otherwise. .CEOTENUR is the number of years since he or she became the CEO. 
YRFOUND indicates the firm's age since it was founded. LOGASSET is the natural log of assets. SEO is a dummy 
variable taking on a value of l if in that year the IPO firm conducted a primary seasoned equity offering (SEO) and zero 
otherwise. 
* significant at lO%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1% 
However, the accrual component tends to oscillate around zero, suggesting no strong 
relationship with earnings or cash flows. Closer investigation shows that only earnings for quartile 
4 are comprised of both positive accruals and cash flows. This further indicates that earnings are 
more influenced by cash flows rather than accruals in our sample. Table 2 reports the transition 
matrices for earnings, accruals, and cash flows. Panel A presents the transition matrices for the 
earnings quartile portfolios. The majority of the firms in the top quartile (Q4) are able to sustain 
their strong earnings performance with 71 percent of the firms remaining in Q4 two years after the 
IPO. 
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f Similarly, the firms in the bottom quartile (Ql) maintain their poor perlormance with 6 1 percentI 
' 
! ' of the firms still in Ql two years after the IPO. This persistence into the future is due to earn ings 
r being primarily attributable to the cash flow component (see Table 1, Panel A).
' \ 
~. The firms in the middle quartiles (Q2 and Q3.) exhibit more instability. In the second year after 
the IPO, only 43 percent of the Q2 firms remain in Q2 and only 40 percent of the Q3 firms remain 
in Q3. Interestingly, earnings performance for 46 percent of the Q3 firms declined to Q2 (28 
percent) and Q1 (18 percent). This deterioration of earnings is probably due to the Q3 firms being 
unable to maintain positive cash flows in excess of negative accruals over the two years subsequent 
to the IPO. The Q3 firms had significantly higher cash flows than the Q2 firms in the IPO year, but 
there was no significant difference between the accrual components which were negative for both 
the Q2 and Q3 firms (see Table 1, Panel A) . The results in Table 2, Panel A suggest that firms in the 
top and bottom earnings quartiles have higher quality earnings compared to the firms in the middle 
quartiles due to the larger cash flow component. 
Table 2 

Transition Matrices for Earnings, Accruals, and Cash.Flows 

Panel A: Transition Matrices for Earnings 

A.l: IPO Year to First Year After IPO (% ) 
Initial Terminal Quarti le 
Quartile 	 Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
Ql 68 21 7 4 
Q2 25 54 	 14 27 
Q3 7 	 28 54 11 
'I 
I Q4 0 	 0 18 82 
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Initial 

Quartile 

Q1 

Ql 
Q3 

Q4 

Initial 

Quartile 

Q1 

Q2 

Q3 

Q4 

A.2: IPO Year to Second Year After IPO (%) 
Terminal Quartile 
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
61 18 14 7 
25 43 25 7 
18 28 40 14 
4 4 21 71 
Panel B: Transition Matrices for Accrual Component 
B .1: 	 IPO Year to First Year After IPO (%) 
Terminal Quartile 
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
52 28 12 8 
20 24 32 24 
16 36 28 20 
12 12 24 52 
B.2: IPO Year to Second Year After IPO (%) 
~-
" 
., 
>I 
Initial Tenninal Quartile 
Quartile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Ql 44 24 8 24 
Q2 24 36 24 16 
Q3 28 20 28 24 
Q4 8 20 32 40 
Panel C: Transition Matrices for Cash Flow Component 
C.l: IPO Year to First Year After IPO (%) 
Initial Terminal Quartile 
Quartile Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
Q1 58 23 15 4 
Q2 28 40 28 4 
Q3 12 28 32 28 
Q4 4 13 17 66 
C.2: IPO Year to Second Year After IPO·(%) 
Initial Terminal Quartile 
Quartile Ql Ql Q3 Q4 
Ql 54 31 11 4 
Q2 24 40 32 4 
Q3 8 20 48 24 
Q4 8 12 8 71 
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Table 3 

Ordered Logit Estimation Results 

(l) 
.Earnings 
(2) 
Accruals 
(3) 
Cash flows 
Coef. z-stat Coef. z-stat Coef. z-stat 
BODSIZE -0.140 1.43 -0.288 3.40*** 0.356 3.21 *** 
ODPCTBOD -0.008 0.78 -0.013 1. 17 -0.008 0.74 
AUDCOM -0.572 1.99** -0.159 0.52 -0.774 2.69*** 
COMPCOM 0.486 2.08** -0~053 0.20 0.957 3.32*** 
EXTBLOCK -0.011 1.32 0.004 0.50 0.013 1.58 
TOTCEOWN 0.032­ 2.60*** 0.016 1.52 0.024 2.22** 
CEOCHAffi -0.211 0.67 -1.065 3.44*** -0.446 1.43 
CEOFOUND -0.577 1.85* -0.080 0.26 -0.320 1.05 
CEOTENUR 0.090 2.27** 0 .073 1.90* 0.034 0.97 
YRFOUND 0.159 6.35*** 0.030 0.99 0.133 5.19*** 
LOGASSET 0.358 2.56** -0.256 2.13** 0.677 5.26*** 
SEO 0.404 . 1.09 0.858 2.15** -0.955 2.20** 
TREND -0.263 1.70* 0.038 0.27 -0.264 1.78* 
Chi-square 17,233 22,807 24,189 
%of 
predicted 
correctly 36.14% 33.64% 41.43% 
Pseudo R-
square 0.2731 0.2007 0.2325 
Observations 321 321 321 
(I) Ordered logit estimation results of firms ranked by earnings into quartile portfolios. 
(2) Ordered logit estimation results of firms ranked by the accrual component of earnings into quanile portfolios. 
(3) Ordered logjt estimation results of firms ranked by the cash flow component of earnings imo quartile portfolios. 
BODSIZE indicates the number of board members. ODPCTBOD indicates the percemage of outside directors in the 
board(%). AUDCOM indicates the number of audit committee board members, while COMPCOM indicates the 
number of compensation committee board members. EXTBLOCK indicates the percentage of external (non-insiders 
and non-board members) blockholders ownership(%). TOTCEOWN is the percenLage of CEO ownership(%). 
CEOCHAIR is a dummy variable taking on a value of one if the CEO is the chairman of the board and zero 
otherwise. CEOFOUND is a dummy variable takjng on a value of one if the CEO is the founder of the firm and zero 
otherwise. CEOTENUR is the number of years since she or he became the CEO. YRFOUND indicates the firm's 
age since it was founded. LOGASSET is the natural log of assets. SEO is a du mmy variable taking on a value of one 
if in that year the IPO firm conducted a primary seasoned equity offering (SEQ) and zero otherwise. TREND is the 
time trend that takes on the value of zero at the year of 1PO, one for one year after the IPO and two for two years 
after the IPO. The estimated slope coefficients for the industry dummies (two-digit SIC) are not reported. 
.* significant at l 0%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1% 
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I Panel B reports the transition matrices for the accrual component of earnings. For the firms with 
, I 	 the highest accruals in the IPO year, 40 percent of the firms are still·in the top quartile (Q4) in 
the second year after the IPO. Similar results are found for the bottom quartile (Ql) firms. This 
evidence suggests that firms with extreme accruals are unable to maintain the accruals in the 
future. This migration is even more pronounced in the middle quartiles (Q2 and Q3) where only 
36 percent (Q2) and 28 percent (Q3) of the firms are able to remain in the same quartile in the 
second year after the IPO. 
The results in Panel B imply that firms with earnings that are primarily attributable to the accrual 
component have low quality earnings since the accrual component is not sustainable into the 
future. The migration of the Q2 and Q3 firms is more pronounced since there are no significant 
differences between the two quartiles (see Table 1, Panel B). 
The transition matrices for the cash flow component quartile portfolios are shown in Panel C. 
The majority of the firms in the top quartile (Q4) of cash flows are able to sustain their high level 
of cash flows with 71 percent of the firms remaining in Q4 two years after the JPO. Of the firms 
with the largest negative cash flows in Ql, 54 percent remain in Ql two years subsequent to the 
IPO. Similar to the results in Panels A and B, the firms in the middle quartiles are much more 
unstable. Two years after the IPO, 40 percent of the Q2 firms remain in Q2 and 48 percent of the 
Q3 firms remain in Q3. Contrary to the findings in Panel A, only 28 percent (versus 46 percent 
for total earnings) of the Q3 firms declined to Q2 (20 percent) and Ql (eight percent). This is 
probably due to the negative relationship between cash flows and accruals (see Table 1, Panel 
C). The Table 2, Panel C results indicate that firms with earnings that are primarily attributable 
, I 	 to the cash flow component have high quality earnings since the large cash flow component 
(both positive and negative) is sustainable into the future. 
The ordered logit estimation results are reported in Table 3. Since the model is non-linear, we 
concentrate on the sign and statistical significance of the slope estimates. The results from the 
ordered logit model connotes the effect of corporate governance factors on the likelihood that an 
IPO firm will be in the first, second, third, or fourth quartile of earnings, accruals, or cash flows. 
Column (l) presents the results of firms ranked into quartile portfolios by earnings. We find 
that the size of the compensation committee, percentage of CEO ownership, CEO tenure, firm 
age and asset size are positive and significant; however, the size of the audit committee and CEO 
as founder of the company are negative and significant. These findings suggest that firms are 
more likely to be in the top quartile of earnings (Q4) when they have larger compensation 
committees but smaller audit committees, higher CEO ownership and tenure, a founder who is 
not the CEO, and are older and larger. 
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The results for firms ranked into quartile portfolios by the accrual component of earnings are 
reported in column (2). We find that board size, CEO as ch airman of the board, and firm size are 
negative and significant, and CEO tenure and seasoned equity offering are positive and 
significant. These results indicate that firms are more likely to be in the top accrual quartile (Q4) 
when they have smaller boards, the CEO is not the chairman of the board, and smaller. 
However, the top accrual firms have longer-tenured CEOs and are more likely to conduct a 
primary seasoned equity offering. 
Column (3) presents the results for finns ranked into quartile portfolios by the cash flow 
component of earnings. We find that the size of the board and compensation committee, 
percentage of CEO ownership, firm age and size are positive and significant. In contrast, size of 
the audit committee and seasoned equity offering are negative and significant. These findings 
impl y that finn s are more likely to be in the top cash flow quartile (Q4) when they have larger 
boards and compensation co mmittees , but smaller audit committees, higher percentage of CEO 
ownership, and are older and larger. However, these firms are less likel y to conduct a seasone d 
equity offering. 
In summary, IPO firms are more likely to be in the top quartile of earnings and cash flows when 
they are older, larger, and have stronger corporate governance. These firms also have hi gher 
quality earnings that are sustainable into the future. Additionally, IPO firms with high cash 
flows do not nee d to conduct a seasoned equity offering to obtain more capital. On the other 
hand, IPO firms are more likely to be in the top accrual qu artile when they are smaller and have 
weaker governance. These firms were also found to have lower quality earnings since they were 
not able to maintain the high accruals into the furure. Moreover, these firms conduct seaso ne d 
equity offerings in order to raise additional fundin g. 
Conclusion 
This paper examines the quality of reported earnings and corporate go vernance in IPO firms. 
We define the quality of earnings as the stability and the likelihood of earnings, and its accrual 
and cash flow components, to fall within four different quartiles. In the JPO year and two 
subsequent years, we form quartile portfolios by ranking the IPO firms on earnings, accruals, and 
cash flows, where quartile 1 consists of the lowest and quartile 4 consists of the highest earnings, 
accruals, or cash flow s .. First, we create transition matrices for each of the quarti le portfolios to 
determine the stability of earnings , accruals, and cash flows across the different quartiles in the 
two-year period after the IPO. Second, we use an ord ered logit model to analyze the effect of 
corporate governance factors on the likelihood that JPO firm s will be in the first, second, third, or 
fourth quartiles of earnings , accruals, and cash flows in the JPO year and two follow ing years. 
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Our analysis of the transltlon matrices indicates that the accrual component is much more r. 
unstable than earnings and the cash flow component. This is consistent with Sloan [1996], who 
finds that current earnings is less likely to persist into the future if it is attributable primarily to 
the accrual component of earnings, as opposed to the cash flow component. We also find that 
firms in the second and third quartiles have a higher probability of migrating to a different 
quartile in the two years following an IPO than firms in the top and bottom quartiles. This 
suggests that firms in the top and bottom quartiles in the IPO year, particularly for earnings and 
cash flows, are more likely to sustain the same reporting procedures during the two years after 
the IPO. 
The estimation results of our ordered logit model indicate that IPO firms are more likely to be in 
the top quartile of earnings and cash flows when the firms are larger and have a stronger 
governance structure. We find that IPO firms have a greater probability of having the highest 
reported accruals when they are smaller with weaker governance, and are more likely to raise 
additional funding through seasoned offerings. These findings indicate that governance structure 
influences the quality of reported earnings and its accrual and cas h flow components . Overall, 
our finding s provide supporting evidence that adoption of SOX, which enforces firms to have a 
stronger governance structure, should have a positive impact on the quality of ftrms' reported 
eammgs. 
: • 
i 	 Endnotes
:! 
.· 
1. 	 The two years after the IPO peak period (1998-1999) are just p rior to the s tock market crash 
of March 2000. We limit our sample to this period so as not to con taminate our findings with 
the impact of the stock market downturn in the United States in the years following our 
sample period. Also, our study focuses on the corporate governance structure and financial 
reporti ng of IPO firms prior to the corporate scandals and reform initiatives: 
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